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In recent years, a growing body of critical literature has emerged that challenges the 
dominant norms and practices of mainstream suicidological research. Concerns over 
epistemology and methodology, the (political) rationales that determine how suicide is 
researched and responded to, and the lack of measurable advances in knowledge and 
prevention, are, for a growing number of scholars, symptoms of a more widely felt 
paradigm crisis in contemporary suicide research. Tom Widger (2015) crystallises the 
incommensurability between the globalising paradigm of ‘scientific’ suicidology and the 
meanings and nuances of self-inflicted death in specific cultural contexts, extending the 
concerns raised by our article ‘Suicidology as a Social Practice’ (2014). While recent 
debates have largely focused on issues of methodological pluralism as a way of moving 
suicidology forward, Widger questions the degree by which any study of suicide can truly 
subvert the suicidological paradigm when it produces both the subject and object 
involved. As he says, the very concept of suicide is suicidological. 
 
Widger’s central challenge to all those involved in suicidology is to articulate whether 
‘post-suicidological’ suicide research is even possible, and, if so, what it might look like. 
Certainly it seems desirable. Anthropological work, of the kind Widger undertakes, 
reveals just how much suicidology cannot ‘see’, and just how richly meaningful (if 
painfully so) self-inflicted death is in different cultural contexts. Such work illustrates the 
interrelatedness and inseparability of the meanings of suicide from broader cultural-
normative views on life and death, their correspondence with a multitude of motivations 
and causes, and, above all, the problem of suicide’s interpretation and representation.  
 
It is this nexus between the representation of suicide (questions of ontology), how we 
should think about it (questions of epistemology), and how we should practically respond 
to it (questions of ethics and politics) that we sought to expose in our original article. So 
although we are in agreement with Widger that human interpretive practices must 
become a central subject of suicidological inquiry, we suggest that these cannot be 
uncoupled from the ethical realm in which a social practice like suicidology operates. 
 
At the core of suicidology is something pressing and urgent: the distress of persons who 
seek to end their own lives and the devastation and grief of family members, friends, and 
communities that result from suicide. Harm and suffering, therefore, are the impetus for 
prevention. Widger is motivated by the same impetus – and he borrows this much from 
suicidology: the frame that suicide is a problem that needs prevention. But does taking up 
this ethical position rely on, or at minimum reproduce, the discourses and concepts of 
suicidology (as Widger wonders)? For, as he points out, it is the very concept of suicide 
that enables current preventively-oriented explanations and makes the epistemological 
terms of suicidology seem inescapable. 
 
To prevent suicide, we need explanations to guide our actions. There are two categories 
of these in suicidology that we need to assess seriously if we wish to contemplate how we 
can shift to a different sort of suicidology, or to a new entity altogether that leaves the 
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epistemological constructions of ‘suicide’ behind. The first is the explanatory power of 
the concept of ‘mental illness’ as the cause of suicide. The second is the power of the 
scientific methodologies that have generated and tested new concepts and provided new 
insights into the causes of suicide. 
 
The Power of the Concept of Mental Illness as the Cause of Suicide 
 
The defining of human experience in terms of biomedicine is a powerful process because 
it can generate concepts that are functionally useful in describing salient dimensions of 
phenomena. These functions have a close fit with the social ‘work’ that concepts – such 
as diagnoses – do, for example, validation and nomenclature for suffering. As an 
umbrella term, the category of mental illness is not especially meaningful, explains little, 
and is a tautology of sorts in that “the (suicidal) act defines the illness and the illness 
defines the act” (O’Connor 2003, 298). Yet defining suicide as an act of mental illness 
(whether officially diagnosed or not) has a number of powerful ethical functions. 
 
First, explanations cast in terms of mental illness can help mitigate suffering – much of 
which arises from blame and social judgement (Sudak, Maxim & Carpenter 2008; Tzeng 
& Lipson 2004). The concept of ‘mental illness’ is rooted in a perspective that reduces 
blame by removing an individual’s responsibility for their suicidal act. Second, 
externalising the problem gives it the structure of explanation. It makes what was occult 
understandable and rational. Third, it catalogues and relates symptoms, giving persons 
back control over often very overwhelming circumstances and telling them unequivocally 
what to do. Thus, it provides treatment. Finally, it validates experience and offers an 
appropriate reformulation of the self. As a consumer, one has access and exposure to a 
range of views of what mental illness is and means. So, although diagnosis is a 
biomedical entity, there is a set of narratives available for persons to draw on that enable 
incorporation of the nuanced, the referential, and the existential—those aspects that 
biomedicine overlooks. 
 
The ethical/ontological concept of mental illness is made more persuasive by the 
observation that many recover from a suicide attempt and then go on to live fulfilling 
lives. This implies that when they attempted suicide the reasons that led them to the act 
were not as immovable as they must have seemed, and that the suicidal person was not 
thinking and perceiving ‘reality’ clearly at the time, and hence, was suffering from an 
abnormal distorting cognitive pathology. Further epistemological validation is similarly 
judged to have occurred when pharmacological and psychological treatments for mental 
illness produce predicted and beneficial effects: this is interpreted as evidence for the 
validity of both the ontological reality of physiological explanations of mental illness and 
of the concept of mental illness altogether. 
 
However, there are several problems with the concept of mental illness of concern to both 
Widger and ourselves. The first is that the concept of mental illness deletes, omits, or 
renders invisible many of the most important explanations of suicide, at least insofar as 
those suffering and attempting and surviving suicide are concerned. The second, concerns 
the ontology of mental illness as it relates to suicide. Neither Widger nor ourselves would 
consider mental illness the ‘cause’ of suicide. Indeed, as Widger notes, the view of 
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suicide as an illness to be prevented is refuted by the majority of his Sinhalese 
participants, evidence that it is a historically and culturally specific concept designed to 
fit the society that produced it. Of course in saying this we are concerned not with the 
utility, epistemological status, or harms of the concept of mental illness, but with its 
connection to suicide. We note, however, that the same question must necessarily be 
asked there; that is, how useful and how harmful is the concept of mental illness? 
 
We also have a number of ethical concerns regarding the concept of ‘mental illness’. 
First, by implying that those who are thinking of ending their lives are not thinking or 
perceiving accurately, moral agency is diminished and with it the deep recognition that a 
moral violation has taken place in which a person’s values, capabilities, or sense of self 
are thwarted and suicide a final act of moral clarity, self-determination, and 
hopelessness—a situation not capturable in terms of ‘mental illness’. Second, the concept 
is one that maps onto a particular kind of personhood—that of contemporary late 
capitalist/neoliberal society. The self of this society is individual, bounded, autonomous, 
and reflexive; one that is called upon to take responsibility to maximize personal 
wellbeing across the life course. Increasingly, any falterings in happiness or satisfaction 
are ascribed to a failure in the individual, and yet these individuals face more extensive 
insecurity and social flux than did the generations that preceded them (Giddens 1991). 
The concept of ‘mental illness’ fits this sort of self. As a diagnosis it provides validation 
and ethical and practical relief—not because of the impact of mental illness per se, but 
because of the parts of life it holds in view as areas of intervention (from controlling the 
emotions through to the fostering of social connections). Those that recover from suicide 
attempts don’t do so because the diagnosis of mental illness is ontologically correct—but 
because they are selves defined by ideas such as responsibility, freedom, initiative, 
authenticity, recovery, and self-improvement; and because they are living in a society of 
sufficient resources and social mobility to enact these ideas, at least some of the time. 
 
Of course the ontology and epistemology of mental illness, and mental illness as a cause 
of suicide, are irresolvably complex. The power of the concept in the face of the 
transformation of experience as a result of pharmacological and psychological treatments 
is not something to turn one’s back on, as advocates within the Sinhalese diaspora and 
other diaspora (and at-home) communities will tell us. Rather than an all-defining reality, 
such concepts, including the biomedical explanations that underwrite them, are perhaps 
best regarded as what they are—heuristics whose functionality is defined by how well 
they explain things (‘things’ being the data we have including lay informant accounts) 
and importantly by how well they don’t. And that in practice is what happens inside 
many consulting rooms, where sympathetic and insightful family practitioners and 
psychiatrists search for metaphors and narratives that can support and enable patients and 
alleviate some suffering. So should post suicidology include the concept of mental 
illness? We suspect that the answer is yes —but only if it is used in a very cautious 
fashion, one highly self-conscious of its limits; rather in the manner in which Americans 
advocate for the use of guns but never display in practice.  
 
Epistemology and Moral and Political Interests 
 
It may be that our chief problem with suicidology is not the very concept of suicide 
itself—even though it imports certain culturally specific features that make the 
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perspective of the Sinhalese different and ‘unseeable’ and produces and constructs its 
subject and object in the terms of Western epistemology and discourse—but with the 
weighting of causes in biomedicine around mental illness. This weighting inevitably 
focuses attention on those risk factors that can be addressed at the individual level 
through medical intervention or education. It therefore overlooks the social determinants 
of suicide and those factors that contribute to suicidal distress including, for example, 
social injustice, inequitable socioeconomic policies, or gender and sexual oppression. By 
attributing these factors to personal attributes rather than to structural deficiencies and 
state institutions, the political and economic forces that foster these inequities, and which 
may lead to poor mental health and suicide, remain unchallenged (Mills 2014). But it is 
these that offer us the greatest and most ethically appropriate arenas for prevention and 
intervention. Many of these can’t be ‘seen’ without the quantifying methodologies of 
epidemiology, and they generate explanations that are as much at odds with Sinhalese 
explanations of self-inflicted death as they are with those of conservative Western 
politicians. In both cases the methodology can and should challenge the values and 
concepts of the societies in which it is applied. It is also amenable, as most scientific 
concepts are, to some redefining through culturally specific lenses.  
 
In our view then, a ‘post–suicidological’ suicidology is one that recognises this nexus 
between ontology, epistemology, ethics, and politics. The way problems are prioritised or 
de-prioritised in suicidology, together with the criteria by which certain data are 
designated as evidence and other data as less strong or less important are, after all, a 
question of values (Carter, Rychetnik, Lloyd et al. 2011). As the work of Stuckler and 
Basu (2013) and Mills (2014) has shown, the mechanisms by which sociopolitical and 
economic conditions of inequality and alienation come to be reconfigured and 
rearticulated as individual problems—as medical problems rather than as ethical and 
sociopolitical problems—exposes the moral and political commitments of 
institutionalised suicidology. Any attempt to conceive of a ‘post-suicidological’ 
suicidology, we believe, needs to start here. That is, with the moral and political ideas 
that are embedded in our social and professional cultures and which underpin 
contemporary responses to suicide, and with the ethical consequences of these. 
 
Contact details: scott.fitzpatrick@newcastle.edu.au; claire.hooker@sydney.edu.au; 
ian.kerridge@sydney.edu.au 
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